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Comment
NEBRASI CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
One of the controversial issues in today's dynamic criminal law
and procedure is the proper role and status of discovery. The notion
of criminal discovery has had an exciting if not always successful
history,' and apparently the trend of the law is toward liberaliza-
tion.2 The Eightieth Session of the Nebraska Legislature attempted
to deal with this area by passing two bills, L.B. 702 and L.B. 1417.
This comment will examine the current role and status of criminal
discovery in Nebraska as a result of the legislation.
I. NEBRASKA PRE-STATUTE LAW
The first Nebraska case to consider a discovery issue was Mar-
shall v. State,8 wherein the defendant sought to inspect two forged
notes. Early Nebraska lav left it to the discretion of the trial court
whether an order for inspection should be entered. Consequently,
the Nebraska court found no abuse of discretion when the defend-
ant's application was denied.5 However, the defendant was given
photostatic copies, and his true purpose seems to have been an
analysis of the ink used. "To have permitted such experiment ...
would possibly mutilate [the notes] . . .6
In Cramer v. State,7 a murder case, the court found no abuse of
discretion in a denial of the defendant's application for inspection
of his confession independent of statute. However, the court recog-
nized this as a new question and posited some interesting language.
1 An interesting glimpse of the history of discovery is contained in sev-
eral New Jersey cases. In State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881
(1953), Chief Justice Vanderbilt set forth in a strong opinion the argu-
ments against discovery. Judge-later Justice-Brennan wrote a stir-
ring dissent. (As basic source material, one should also examine
Justice Brennan's classic article, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting
Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279 (1963).) Five years
later the New Jersey Supreme Court took a position more favorable
to discovery, and a national trend towards liberalization was under
way. See State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958); State v.
Cook, 43 N.J. 560, 206 A.2d 359 (1965).
2 1 C. WSiGHT, FEDERAL PRAcncE AND PsocEDuR § 252 (1969).
3 116 Neb. 45, 215 N.W. 564 (1927). In the same year, Chief Judge Benja-
min Cardozo was also considering the "glimmering" of some notion
of discovery. See People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24,
156 N.E. 84 (1927).
4 Law of Sept. 21, 1858, Part II-Code of Civil Procedure, ch. 4, § 376,
[1858] (repealed 1951).
5 116 Neb. at 55, 215 N.W. at 568.
6 Id. at 56, 215 N.W. at 569.
7 145 Neb. 88, 15 N.W.2d 323 (1944).
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We think that when a prosecution is based upon a written instru-
ment as in a forgery case, the defendant is entitled to inspect and
make copies of such instrument under such conditions as the trial
court may prescribe. If a prosecution is based upon the correctness
or incorrectness of certain records, such as is ofttimes the case in
a prosecution for embezzlement, the examination of such records
by the defendant should be granted. But as to all statements and
documents not admissible in evidence in chief, and obtained for
impeachment or other purposes not going to the merits, the defend-
ant has no basis for demanding an inspection of them. . . .The
rule generally is that a confession need not be produced. However,
we think the trial court should order a written confession produced
where the interests of justice require .... Where the only reason
for the production of a written confession ... is that it would aid
generally in preparing the defense, no basis exists for requiring
the state to produce it. The defense counsel in a criminal prosecu-
tion have no right to inspect or compel the production of evidence
in the possession of the state unless a valid reason exists for so
doing. In the administration of these rules the trial court has a
broad judicial discretion and it is only when such discretion is
abused that error can be based thereon.8
Whatever one may have thought the law to be after Cramer, the
court soon clarified the situation. In Hameyer v. State9 the statute
relied on in Marshall was declared inapplicable to criminal cases.10
Turning then to Cramer, the court found the rule to be reasonable
but discretionary, and found no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's denial of Hameyer's application to inspect a lease which was
relevant to the charge of obtaining money by false pretenses. The
Nebraska rule had become one of privilege and discretion, and
continued unchanged."
s Id. at 94-95, 15 N.W.2d at 327.
9 148 Neb. 798, 29 N.W.2d 458 (1947).
10 Id. at 802-03, 29 N.W.2d at 460. In 1951, the legislature passed L.B. 136
which adopted the rules of discovery found in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Apparently it is thought that these rules, NMn. REV.
STAT. § 26-1267.01 et seq. (Reissue 1964), are also inapplicable to
criminal cases by virtue of the Hameyer case. Hearings on L.B. 1417
Before the Committee on Judiciary, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969) [here-
inafter cited as Hearings on L.B. 1417]. But see Note, Criminal Pro-
cedure-Discovery Practice in Nebraska, 34 NEB. L. REv. 645, 649
(1955).
11 "The trial court has a broad discretion in ruling upon a discovery
motion in a criminal case. State v. Novak, 181 Neb. 90, 147 N.W.2d
156. Such a motion should be granted where required by the interests
of justice. Cramer v. State, 145 Neb. 88, 15 N.W.2d 323. The burden is
on the defendant to show why the motion should be granted. Linder v.
State, 156 Neb. 504, 56 N.W.2d 734." State v. Reichel, 184 Neb. 194, 195.
165 N.W.2d 743, 744 (1969).
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II. THE HISTORY OF L.B. 702 AND L.B. 1417
A. L.B. 702
Legislative Bill 702 was the first of the two bills to be thrown into
the legislative machinery. Judge Carter, Chairman of the Judicial
Council, had appointed a subcommittee to expand the Nebraska sta-
tutes, sections 29-822 to -827, to include pretrial motions in the area
of inculpatory statements and confessions and the legality of con-
frontations between the defendant and those who identified him at
lineups. 2 The Judicial Council, with all seven Nebraska Supreme
Court judges present, had unanimously approved the bill although
some members of the court wanted to expand into the area of gen-
eral criminal discovery. 3 Likewise, the bill's sponsor, in his state-
ment of purpose, recognized the objective was "to provide a
procedure to discover these objections and to decide these questions
ahead of actual trial . . ." and District Judge Elmer Scheele,
speaking for the bill, noted that a more general bill (L.B. 1417)
was being prepared by the Governor's Crime Commission.14
Paul Douglas, County Attorney for Lancaster County, Nebraska,
appeared in opposition, arguing that sections one and two of the
bill as introduced would open the prosecutor's office to the defense.
M/fr. Douglas suggested that these sections be changed and the
Jencks Act definition of "statement" be inserted. Judge Scheele
agreed; the Judicial Council was quickly consulted and agreed to
the change. 15 Consequently, sections one and two were amended
and section three adopted to supply the Jencks Act definition.16
However, somewhere in committee, the bill changed its purpose.
Sections three, four, and five of the bill as introduced provided
the pretrial procedure which was apparently the bill's original
purpose. When the bill left the Committee on Judiciary, section
three had become a definition of "statement" and there were not
any procedural sections.'7 As a result, the purpose seems to have
changed from that of providing a pretrial procedure for determin-
ing constitutional questions to a discovery method, without any
12 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-822 to -827 (Reissue 1964) provide pretrial pro-
cedure for testing issues of search and seizure.
13 Hearings on L.B. 702 Before the Committee on Judiciary, 80th Neb.
Leg. Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on L.B. 702].
14 Id. See L.B. 702, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
1 L.B. 702 as introduced provided for a motion to "produce any written
or oral confession, admission, or statement made by the defendant."
Compare Jencks Act 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964).
16 Hearings on L.B. 702, supra note 13.
17 Neb. Laws c. 230, p. 857 (1969).
88 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 50, NO. 1 (1971)
pretrial procedure for testing issues that might arise.1 8 Nebraska
now had a discovery statute, and four months later there would be
another.
B. L.B. 1417
The Governor's Crime Commission had indeed been working on
a general criminal discovery bill as a matter of first priority.19 Judge
Scheele, as chairman of the subcommittee on courts, ordered the
first draft to be drawn as a "trial balloon"; and although following
much of the substance of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, the first draft made discovery a matter of right and
carefully limited reciprocal discovery by the state.2 0
This draft was circulated to the bar, prosecutors, defenders, and
judges. The responses indicated a consensus favoring discretionary
discovery and a more liberal grant of discovery to the state once
the defendant had begun the discovery process.21
Through the second draft the bill would have been applicable to
defendants charged with either a felony or misdemeanor. 22 How-
ever, by the third draft the scope was limited to felony defendants
and the Jencks Act definition of "statement" had been inserted,
narrowing discoverable material. 23 Nevertheless, although discovery
was discretionary the court should grant it unless it found:
(a) the request is not in any way material to the preparation of
the defense;
(b) the request is made primarily for the purpose of harassing
the prosecution or its witnesses;
(c) the request, if granted, would unreasonably delay the trial
of the offense and an earlier request by the defendant could have
reasonably been made; or
(d) there is a substantial likelihood that the request, if granted,
would preclude a just determination of the issues at the trial of
the offense.24
Is "The purpose of the bill is to give the defendant the right or the
persons who have been charged with crimes to obtain copies of state-
ments made by him. It also gives him the right to interview any
witnesses who may have identified him or have claimed to identify
him." Minutes of the Legislature 850 (statement of sponsor Senator
Fred Carstens, Chairman, Judiciary Committee).
19 Hearings on L.B. 1417, supra note 10.
20 Criminal Discovery Bill (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968).
21 Hearings on L.B. 1417, supra note 10.
22 Criminal Discovery Bill (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1969).
23 Criminal Discovery Bill (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1969).
24 Id.
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When L.B. 1417 reached the Committee on Judiciary it had made
its final change of color. Discovery was to be discretionary, the court
to consider the previously designated factors in exercising its dis-
cretion.25 Senator Pedersen, who introduced the bill at the request
of the Governor, stated that it would implement the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.2 6 Judge Scheele stated that it was some-
thing that could be lived with, a conservative bill deserving of
support.27
During an executive session of the Committee on Judiciary,
Judge Scheele offered an amendment to qualify "person" in section
six with the phrase "other than the defendant." Without that phrase,
depositions could have been taken of the defendant, raising grave
constitutional problems.28 The amended bill was adopted and Ne-
braska had its second criminal discovery statute.2 9
III. CRIMINAL DISCOVERY UNDER THE STATUTES
A. L.B. 702
Defendant may now file a motion to produce his statement or
the names of lineup witnesses, and the county attorney is under a
continuing duty to disclose any discoverable matter under an order
pursuant to the act. Of course, the court has power to enforce com-
pliance. However, L.B. 702, certainly the more direct of the two
acts, raises several questions.
What might be the effect of the definition of "statement" sup-
plied in section three?3 0 The statutory definition may result in the
surprise of unwary defendants by introduction into evidence of
admissions not discoverable under the statute. The problem is pri-
marily one of how statements which do not meet the definition can
be used in cross-examination at trial. Moreover, it is not apparent
that the statute without the definition would have opened the prose-
cutor's office, or that such a result is altogether wrong 1
25 L.B. 702, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
26 Hearings on L.B. 1417, supra note 10.
27 Id.
28 Minutes of the Legislature 3040-41. Interestingly, the limitation
"other than the defendant" had appeared in all tentative drafts.
29 Neb. Laws c. 235, p. 867 (1969).
30 Substantially the same definition is found in L.B. 1417 and these com-
ments should also apply there. See note 93 and accompanying text
infra.
31 "Every other civilized nation permits broad discovery. Our military
law does so as well. Apparently the existence of discovery has not
occasioned a total breakdown of any of these systems." Pye, The De-
fendant's Case for More Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 82, 91 (1963).
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Will the defendant who discovers constitutionally questionable
matter have a pretrial procedure available to challenge its introduc-
tion? It appears extremely doubtful that anything remains of such
a procedure, which was the act's original purpose. The act has be-
come Nebraska Revised Statutes, sections 29-1922 to -1924, and any
correlation to sections 29-824 to -827 will need the most extreme
manipulation.
However, the most interesting question involves the act's rela-
tion to L.B. 1417. Legislative Bill 702 can reasonably be read to re-
quire discovery as a matter of right once the defendant has shown
materiality and reasonableness, 32 the court having discretion to
deny, restrict, or defer only after a sufficient showing by the prose-
cution. Whether or not such an interpretation is accepted, there is
certainly nothing in L.B. 702 that triggers reciprocal discovery.33
Consequently, a serious problem of interplay exists between L.B.
702 and L.B. 1417.
Legislative Bill 1417 provides for reciprocal discovery by the
state as a condition of defendant's discovery; L.B. 702 has no such
provision. Statements of the defendant are discoverable under both.
Arguably the name of an eyewitness who identified the defendant at
a lineup is the name of a witness on whose evidence the charge is
based.34 A defendant moving for discovery under L.B. 702 may be
met by a prosecutor seeking reciprocal discovery under L.B. 1417.
The narrow category of discoverable matter under L.B. 702
should be exempt from counterdiscovery. Certainly the original
purpose of L.B. 702, pretrial procedure for constitutional questions
involving statements and lineup identification, does not fit the quid
pro quo notion of an exchange of privileges by state and defendant.
Of course, the original purpose of L.B. 702 was lost in the shuffle.
Nevertheless, a reading which makes discovery a right under L.B.
702 could be sustained,35 and the specific categories of L.B. 702
should control the general discovery provided in L.B. 1417.86
32 Neb. Laws c. 230, p. 857 (1969).
33 Compare Neb Laws c. 230, p. 857 (1969) with Neb. Laws c. 235, p.
867 (1969).
34 Neb. Laws c. 235, p. 867 (1969).
35 "The purpose of the bill is to give the defendant the right . . . to
obtain copies of statements made by him. It also gives him the right
to interview any witness who may have identified him or have claimed
to identify him." Minutes of the Legislature 850 (statement of Senator
Carstens, sponsor of L.B. 702) (emphasis added). Compare: "Now it
allows the defendant as well as the prosecution to get information ... "
Minutes of the Legislature 3040-41 (statement of Senator Pedersen,
sponsor of L.B. 1417) (emphasis added).
36 The two acts may be entirely irreconcilable. It has been suggested that
an effort will be made to repeal L.B. 702 in the 81st session of the
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B. L.B. 1417
Legislative Bill 1417 is the more formidable of the two statutes,
both in scope and in purpose. The scope of L.B. 1417 is purposefully
broad to include as discoverable matter all that is consistent with
the fair and effective administration of criminal justice. A myriad of
reasons have been suggested as underlying the notion of criminal
discovery. 7 However, this comment will limit itself to several pur-
poses of L.B. 1417 which are of particular importance in the opera-
tion of the statute.
It would seem reasonable for a defendant to ask what, if any,
benefit can be derived from L.B. 1417 if he was entitled to discre-
tionary discovery under prior case law.35 First, defense counsel may
be more likely to initiate discovery procedure with the relatively
high visibility of a specific statute. And, the apparently wide range
of discoverable items may encourage its use where such items were
doubtfully procurable under the case law of discretion. Further-
more, the statute may encourage prosecutors to voluntarily disclose
enumerated matter.
Second, and perhaps most important, many Nebraska prosecu-
tors allowed discovery without resort to judicial order. But there
was a great discrepancy in the practice from county to county. The
statute will hopefully establish a uniform practice across the state.
It is in this respect that the language of L.B. 1417 is most unfor-
tunate.
Throughout the drafting stage the bill was phrased in what
might be termed semi-discretionary language: "The court shall
issue such an order pursuant to this section unless it finds that:
. .."39 The writer believes that phrasing, and the notion that dis-
covery was to be granted unless the enumerated factors applied, to
legislature. Interview with Walter D. Weaver, Executive Director,
Governor's Copmuission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice,
March 31, 1970.
37 See ABA PROJECT ON MI33NMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIIVNAL JUSTICE,
DiscovERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL §§ 1.1-1.5 (Tent. Draft 1969)
[hereinafter cited as ABA PROJECT]; TASK FORCE REPORT: TEm CoURTs
41-44 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. The reasons
can generally be classified as those pertaining to pretrial decisions
and those concerned with developments at trial. The more obvious
pretrial purposes of discovery are found in decisions whether to press
charges, whether to go to trial, whether to resist the charges, and in
plea bargaining negotiations. At trial, of course, discovery is invalu-
able in avoiding delays caused by collateral issues, preventing sur-
prise, saving time and money, and assuring effective cross-examination.
38 See State v. Reichel, 184 Neb. 194, 165 N.W.2d 743 (1969).
39 Criminal Discovery Bill (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1969) (emphasis added).
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be more conducive to the establishment by the Nebraska Supreme
Court, through a case-by-case approach, of uniform standards for
the grant or denial of discovery. It is hoped that courts will treat
the statutory language in a manner amenable to reasoned elabora-
tion rather than as mere boundaries for wide-ranging discretion.
Third, the statute requires that whenever the court refuses to
grant a discovery order it shall render its findings in writing.40 The
efficacy of this provision may well depend on how the courts view
their discretionary function. If the enumerated factors are merely
to be considered in the exercise of the court's discretion, a written
statement of findings may have little value in the establishment of
uniform standards.
Fourth, section two of the act should allow defendants an oppor-
tunity to make or share results of scientific tests with the state.41
Should the state have a comprehensive crime laboratory, this pro-
vision will take on increased significance and allow courts to estab-
lish rules for the joint use of such a facility.
Fifth, section six allows the use of depositions in a felony case.
Either party may initiate procedures, the ordering of depositions
being discretionary with the court upon a showing of materiality
or relevance and that the depositions may be of assistance.42 This
appears broad enough to almost guarantee that any reasonable
request will be granted. Depositions are, of course, limited in their
use at trial to impeaching a witness. Hopefully, use of this pro-
cedure can avoid surprise at trial. It may also be of benefit to the
defendant by alerting the prosecution to a weak case before it has
reached a point of no return, thus sparing that defendant the ordeal
of trial.
The effect of the depositions provision may be of more moment
than is readily apparent. The provision goes well beyond the limits
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Rule 15,
depositions may only be taken at the instance of a material witness
or the defendant. Their purpose is only to preserve evidence rather
than discovery.43 Furthermore, the issuance of an order is severely
limited.4 4 Consequently, depositions upon the motion of the prose-
40 Neb. Laws c. 235, p. 867 (1969).
41 This procedure could have solved the problem of ink analysis dis-
cussed in Marshall v. State, 116 Neb. 45, 215 N.W. 564 (1927). See note
3 and accompanying text supra.
42 Neb. Laws c. 235, p. 867 (1969).
43 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 241 (1969).
44 Id.
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cution may raise confrontation clause problems even in the narrow
area of impeachment at trial.45
Finally, L.B. 1417 creates a continuing statutory duty to inform
the other party of discoverable items after an order is granted,
provides flexible sanctions for enforcement by the court, and taxes
the prosecuting authority the reasonable costs of the process when-
ever a defendant is adjudged indigent.46
C. STATE v. DAVIS 47
The Davis case marks the first appearance of statutory criminal
discovery in a Nebraska court. The defendant was denied discovery
of reports of scientific tests relating to blood and hair specimens
on a station wagon where the body of the deceased had been found.4 8
The state called two expert witnesses from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation Laboratory in Washington, D. C., who testified con-
cerning the blood and hair specimens. At the close of the state's
evidence the defendant requested a continuance to confer with
similar experts. The motion was overruled and assigned as error
on appeal from a conviction for first degree murder.4 9
It is apparent that the test results were discoverable under sec-
tion two of L.B. 1417 .5o Unfortunately, the court did not clearly
decide whether the denial of discovery vitiated the trial. Rather,
the court decided that the denial of discovery was one of several
errors assigned which, when considered together, presented a ques-
tion of whether the defendant received a fair trial.51 However, if
considered separately, the particular errors may not have required
that the judgment be reversed.52
45 Id. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). But see
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965), and TAsK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 37, at 43. Chief Justice Taft also urged depositions upon
motion of the state. Taft, The Administration of the Criminal Law, 15
YALE LJ. 1 (1905).
46 These provisions may be constitutionally required. "[Tjhe suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process ...." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
"There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 19 (1956).
47 185 Neb. 433, 176 N.W.2d 657 (1970).
48 Id. at 442-43, 176 N.W.2d at 663.
49 Id.
50 Neb. Laws c. 235, p. 867 (1969).
51 185 Neb. at 442-43, 176 N.W.2d at 663.
52 Id.
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Although the court did not decide the effect of a denial of dis-
covery when it is the only error assigned, there is language which
suggests that the legislative pronouncements in the area have made
the grant of discovery the rule and denial the exception.
We have said that the trial court has a broad discretion in ruling
upon a discovery motion, but that such a motion should be granted
where required by the interests of justice. We have been slow to
reverse where discovery has been denied.
The scientific evidence in this case was of particular importance
because it tended to disprove any theory of accidental death. The
Legislature has now provided for discovery in felony cases. 53
In addition to the discovery statutes, the court and bar should
be cognizant of the relevant provisions of the ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. The Disciplinary Rules found therein are
mandatory in character and state the minimum level of professional
conduct.54 Disciplinary Rule 7-103 (B) provides:
A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal liti-
gation shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant,
or to the defendant if he has no counsel, of the existence of evi-
dence, known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the
offense, or reduce the punishment.55
While the special prosecutor in the Davis case may have conformed
with a narrow reading of DR 7-103 (B), it seems doubtful that the
spirit of the provision was being followed.56
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY QUESTIONS
There are two questions of overriding importance submerged in
L.B. 1417: (1) whether discovery by the defendant is a right or a
privilege; and (2) whether any discovery by the government is con-
sistent with the privilege against self-incrimination. In addition,
there are other questions of law and policy deserving of consid-
eration.
A. THE STATus OF DIsCOVERY
While liberalization of criminal discovery is an obvious trend,
there is no agreement about whether the trend is the result of the
recognition of a right, or the expansion of a privilege. It may be
that the question poses a linguistic dilemma which can be slipped
between only after experience has supplied more facts, for use in
policy analysis rather than semantic deadlock.57 It is more profit-
53 Id. (citations omitted).
54 Preamble and Preliminary Statement, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPON-
SIBILITY.
55 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIIITY DR 7-103 (B).
56 See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13.
57 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 252 (1969).
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able to examine the expressed and implicit policies involved rather
than become embroiled in the rhetoric of right or privilege. 5
While one generally thinks of discovery as trial oriented, liti-
gated cases are exceptions in our system of criminal justice. Dis-
covery can be an invaluable tool at the pretrial decisional level.
Facts are vital to intelligent decisions in determining whether to
resist the charges, and in negotiating pleas. Additionally, those cases
which are contested can be more readily segregated. "The prompt
identification of those cases which should go to trial enables prose-
cutors and counsel to concentrate greater attention on pretrial
preparation, and it encourages early disposition in the remaining
majority of cases."5 9
Defendants who are inclined to perjure themselves are likely to
do so regardless of whether discovery is granted.6 0 Moreover, risks
to witnesses and threats of intimidation are a reality only in the
unusual case. It is here that the court can best exercise its discretion
to draw protective orders. "If the case is important enough for
perjury, intimidation, or bribery, it is important enough for the
defendant to employ the necessary means to ascertain the identity
of Government witnesses. Discovery is not needed."61 Fears of char-
acter defects in the defense bar, even if assumed to have once been
valid, should be alleviated by the changing makeup of defense
counsel. The bar is also recognizing that more definite standards of
conduct and effective discipline are preferable to a denial of bene-
ficial procedure.6 2
The seriousness of criminal prosecution should counsel for the
widest latitude in disclosing information. A system of justice which
places money and property above life and liberty raises grave ques-
tions of value. 3 Finally, although American experience with broad
58 Nevertheless, the writer cannot pass up one rhetorical salvo. "The
State's obligation is not to convict, but to see that, so far as possible,
truth emerges. This is also the ultimate statement of its responsibility
to provide a fair trial under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. No respectable interest of the State is served by its con-
cealment of information which is material, generously conceived, to
the case, including all possible defenses." Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S.
66, 98 (1967) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Fortas).
59 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 37, at 42.
60 Pye, supra note 31, at 91.
61 Id.
62 ABA PROJECT, supra note 37, at 39.
63 "It shocks my sense of justice that in these circumstances counsel for
an accused facing a possible death sentence should be denied inspec-
tion of his confession which, were this a civil case could not be de-
nied." State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 231, 98 A.2d 881, 896 (1953) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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criminal discovery has been limited and not subjected to empirical
research, the experience of other nations has not resulted in a
breakdown of their systems.6 4
B. DISCOVERY BY THE PROSECUTION
The reciprocal discovery provision of L.B. 141765 raises a critical
constitutional question, along with interesting questions of policy.
The concept of reciprocal discovery springs from the notion that the
"accused has every advantage." 66 Unfortunately, reciprocal discov-
ery does not tend to perpetuate that notion.
Jones v. Superior Court67 laid the foundation for the entering
wedge of reciprocal discovery. In Jones, the defendant filed a mo-
tion for a continuance in order to prepare medical evidence for a
defense of impotence to a charge of rape. The prosecution filed for
and was granted a discovery order. Jones sought a writ of pro-
hibition.
Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, limited the discovery
order, but held that the prosecution was entitled to discover the
names of witnesses the defendant intended to call and any medical
reports or x-rays the defendant intended to introduce into evidence
to support the particular affirmative defense of impotence. The
court's reasoning was based on judicial approval of "alibi statutes"
(requiring the defendant to disclose names of witnesses who are
to be called for a particular affirmative defense such as alibi) ,68 and
the idea that the disclosure simply requires defendant to disclose
information that he will shortly reveal anyway.
A vigorous dissent was drafted by Justice Peters:
The simple fact is that our system of criminal procedure is founded
upon the principle that the ascertainment of facts is a "one way
street." It is the constitutional right of the defendant, who is pre-
sumed to be innocent, to stand silent while the state attempts to
meet its burden of proof, that is, to prove the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.69
64 Pye, supra note 31, at 91.
65 Neb. Laws c. 235, p. 867 (1969).
66 See Judge Learned Hand's classic statement in United States v. Gars-
son, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
67 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
68 See New Jersey v. Angeleri, 51 N.J. 382, 241 A.2d 3 (1968) (collecting
cases).
69 Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 64-65, 372 P.2d 919, 924, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 879, 884 (1962).
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Justice Peters argued that the majority had limited the Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination to only those
defendants who did not, even incidentally, disclose an affirmative
defense. Furthermore, the Justice argued that it was a logical im-
possibility for a trial court to determine in advance what informa-
tion requested by the state related solely to an affirmative defense,
and would not be of aid to the state in the preparation of its case
against the defendant7
Justice Dooling, dissenting, prophesied the future:
[A]re we opening the door.., to a general inquiry by the prose-
cution ... ? [If soJ we are depriving the defendant of the right
which he heretofore always enjoyed of waiting until the close of
the prosecution's case to determine the defense or defenses, if any,
which he might then interpose .... I am fearful as a matter of
policy of the future outcome .... 1
In the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, the Criminal Rules Committee, largely on the strength of
Jones, opted for conditional reciprocity for the prosecution in Rule
16 (c).72 However, Rule 16 steps beyond the scope of Jones, and
L.B. 1417 pushes even further to the wall.
Prosecution discovery is allowed under Rule 16 only when
the defendant has been granted relief under subsection (a) (2) or
(b) of that rule.73 The court may, under such circumstances, con-
dition the defendant's grant by ordering reciprocity for the gov-
ernment. It should be noted that discovery under Rule 16, subsec-
tion (a) (1) does not trigger reciprocal discovery, and that the
defendant's discovery of matter under that subsection is treated
almost as a matter of right.7 4 Notice that although Rule 16 (c) does
limit government discovery to comparable items which defendant
intends to produce at trial, there is no limit as to its use as an
affirmative defense 5
Legislative Bill 1417 has further broadened the state's scope of
reciprocity by allowing state discovery upon the grant of any dis-
covery order for the defendant under sections one or two of the
act.76 As a result, the defendant's request for his statement may
70 Id. at 66, 372 P.2d at 925, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
71 Id. at 68-69, 372 P.2d at 927, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
72 FED. R. CRm. P. 16 (c). See 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDUR § 256 (1969).
73 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AmD PROCEDURE § 255 (1969).
74 Id. at § 253.
75 FED. R. Cp-M. P. 16(c). See 39 F.R.D. 276 (Justice Douglas dissenting
from the rule).
76 Neb. Laws c. 235, p. 867 (1969).
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result in a grant of discovery to the state. 77 It is also questionable
whether L.B. 1417 follows the notion of mutual disclosure found
in Rule 16.78
A reading of the counterdiscovery provision of L.B. 1417 raises
a reasonable fear of a possible interpretation giving too wide a
latitude to the state's discovery:
Sec. 5. (1) Whenever the court issues an order pursuant to the
provisions of sections 1 and 2 of this act, the court may condition
its order by requiring the defendant to grant the prosecution like
access to comparable items or information included within the
defendant's request which:
(a) Are in the possession, custody, or control of the defendant;
(b) The defendant intends to produce at the trial; and
(c) Are material to the preparation of the prosecution's case.79
Certainly, the prosecution's request must be reasonable.8s A proper
interpretation should consider items and information as one class
comparable to the class of matter disclosed by the state upon the
grant of defendant's request, and read subsections (a), (b), and (c)
as being total and inseparable requirements of the matter before
it can be discoverable by the state.
As a question of constitutional law, the issue of self-incrimina-
tion is beyond the scope of this comment.si However, as a policy
issue the counterdiscovery provision of L.B. 1417 should be inter-
preted as narrowly as possible. Even assuming constitutionality,
the great principle of the Fifth Amendment counsels caution and
restraint.
77 See Neb. Laws c. 230, p. 857 (1969). See also note 32 and accompany-
ing text supra which notes the conflicts here between L.B. 702 and
L.B. 1417.
I8 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 255 (1969). See Rez-
neck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1276
(1966).
79 Neb. Laws c. 235, p. 867 (1969).
80 Unlike Rule 16(c), reasonableness is not expressly required to be
shown before the grant of the discovery order. However, it must be
implicit in an area operating on the ragged fringe of the Fifth Amend-
ment. See 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 255 (1969).
s See Louisefl, Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination: Roger Tray-
nor Confronts the Dilemma, 53 CALM'. L. REv. 89 (1965). Professor
Louisell presents an excellent analysis of the confrontation of issues
and the policies which must be considered. See Orfield, The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 445 (1966); Smith
& McCallom, Counterdiscovery in Criminal Cases: Fifth Amendment
Privileges Abridged, 54 A.B.A.J. 256 (1968); Comment, Discovery in
Federal Criminal Cases-Rule 16 and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 35 FORD. L. REv. 315 (1966); Note, Constitutionality of
Conditional Mutual Discovery Under Federal Rule 16, 19 OKLA. L. REV.
417 (1966).
COMMENTS
The American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards
for Criminal Justice has rejected the notion of conditional discovery
embodied in Rule 16 and L.B. 1417. Avoiding any expression of
opinion on the constitutional issue, the Project Advisory Com-
mittee's reasoning is of interest:
If disclosures to the accused promote finality, orderliness, and effi-
ciency in prosecutions generally, these gains should not depend
upon the possibly capricious willingness of the accused to make
reciprocal disclosures. Indeed, there is considerable doubt whether,
in practice, the imposition of a condition will accomplish anything
but denial of disclosures to the accused. Certainly, the usual rea-
sons for denying disclosures to the accused--dangers of perjury or
intimidation of witnesses-are not alleviated by forcing the defend-
ant to make discovery, nor are they by his failure to disclose.8 2
The A.B.A. Standards do allow for independent discovery by the
state which is clearly within constitutional boundaries. Such dis-
covery is of the kind of non-testimonial disclosures by the accused
which can be compelled at trial (voice, handwriting, specimens,
etc.) and reports prepared by independent experts (physical or
mental examinations, scientific tests, and experiments or compari-
sons) .8
C. OTHm PoLicY CoNsiAToNs RELEVANT TO L.B. 1417
Legislative Bill 1417 applies only to felony defendants, misde-
meanor defendants having been deleted in the third tentative draft
stage.84 By contrast, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure apply
to all criminal proceedings.85 Only trials of petty offenses before
United 'States Commissioners are excepted.86 Similarly, the A.B.A.
Standards apply in "all serious criminal cases."87 The Advisory
Committee did not draw the distinction between felonies and misde-
meanors nor between courts of general or limited jurisdiction. 8
It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to argue that crim-
inal discovery is fundamental to the American scheme of justice.89
Yet, if there is a right to a jury trial in a misdemeanor case,90 and
82 ABA PROJECT, supra note 37, at 45.
83 Id. at §§ 3.1-3.2.
84 Compare Criminal Discovery Bill (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1969) with Crim-
inal Discovery Bill (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1969).
85 FED. R. CRnv. P. 1. See 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 21 (1969).
8G See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401, 3402 (1964).
87 ABA PROJECT, supra note 37, at § 1.5.
89 Id. at 52.
89 Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
90 Id.
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if the parties are prepared to take the case to trial, it would not
seem unreasonable to argue that the procedures available to a fel-
ony defendant should be available to the alleged misdemeanant.
Indeed, the Equal Protection Clause may require that a similarly
situated misdemeanant be afforded the procedures available to the
felony defendant.9 1 The defendant accused of a serious misdemeanor,
facing a litigated determination of guilt or innocence and the ensu-
ing consequences, should be within the purview of L.B. 1417.92
Like L.B. 702, L.B. 1417 limits discoverable statements to those
which are made to a prosecuting authority and are substantially
verbatim.93 Neither Rule 16 of the Federal Rules nor the A.B.A.
Standards makes such a specific limitation 4 Under Rule 16,
federal courts have allowed discovery of recorded statements be-
tween defendants and third persons,95 and discovery of government
reports summarizing the substance of defendant's statements. 6
Although the Advisory Committee of the A.B.A. Project split on
this issue, the majority believed that a liberal definition of state-
ment was required.9 7 As a secondary effect, the majority felt the
liberal standard would discourage the police practice of destroying
original notes after transforming them into secondary material so
as to avoid cross-examination. The issue splitting the Advisory
Committee was not whether the prosecutor's files would be opened,
but the use of the statements on cross-examination.9 9
The restrictive definition of statement in the two bills is unfor-
tunate. Material not fitting the definition should not be altogether
undiscoverable. Rather, courts should allow discovery of such mat-
91 "The Constitution does not require that things different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. But it does require, in
its concern for equality, that those who are similarly situated be simi-
larly treated." Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 344 (1949).
92 The same arguments should apply to L.B. 702.
93 Neb. Laws c. 235, p. 867 (1969). See Jencks Act 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)
(1964).
94 FED. R. Canv. P. 16; ABA PROJECT, supra note 37, at 62-63.
95 See United States v. Black, 282 F. Supp. 35 (D.D.C. 1968); United
States v. Lubomski, 277 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
96 See United States v. Scharf, 267 F. Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). "The
philosophy underlying Rule 16, in our judgment, applies equally to
verbatim statements and summaries thereof." United States v. Morri-
son, 43 F.R.D. 516, 519 (N.D. IlM. 1967).
97 ABA PROJECT, supra note 37, at 62.
98 Id.
99 Id. But see ABA PROJECT, supra note 37, at 135 (Chief Justice Taft
believed the liberal definition of statement would hamper law enforce-
ment personnel).
COMMENTS
ter as "documents, . . . or other tangible things of whatsoever
kind."'' 00 Rather than deny discovery, the court in its discretion
could control the use of summary statements during the cross-
examination, and certainly, the nature of the statement could be
indicated to the trier of fact' 0 '
A discussion of the policy considerations of L.B. 1417 is incom-
plete without pondering the decision to include a provision for the
use of depositions as a discovery device.10 2 Vermont was the first
state to allow depositions in criminal cases. 03 Experience there
seems to indicate satisfaction with the notion, the most striking
result being a decrease in the likelihood of trial'0 4 Task Force
Report: The Courts also strongly recommends the use of deposi-
tions 05
However, the use of depositions is surrounded with practical
(and perhaps constitutional) problems which may need to be ironed
out by patient experience and sound judgment. Depositions are a
time-consuming affair which may unreasonably prolong the crim-
inal process. 06 The expense involved can be tremendous, and may
present special problems in cases involving indigent defendantsOT
Additionally, the use of depositions by the prosecution walks the
tight-rope of conduct permissible under the confrontation clause. 08
It is hoped that the Vermont experience will follow in Nebraska,
depositions being used to general satisfaction and being more likely
to result in a disposition other than by trial.0 9
V. CONCLUSION
Criminal discovery is now statutory in Nebraska. It should be
apparent that the drafters of L.B. 1417 had as one of their primary
purposes the establishment of some degree of certainty and uni-
formity in criminal discovery. However, the change of purpose in
L.B. 702, from a pretrial procedure for testing constitutional ques-
tions of criminal procedure to a straightforward discovery pro-
100 Neb. Laws c. 235, p. 867 (1969).
101 ABA PROJECT, supra note 37, at 63.
102 See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
103 Langrock, Vermont's Experience in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J. 732
(1967).
104 Id. at 733-34.
105 TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 37, at 43.
106 See Hoffman, What Next in Federal Criminal Rules, 21 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1, 15-16 (1964).
107 Id. See 1 Camv . L.R. 2016 (1967) (New Jersey's decision not to imple-
ment depositions).
105 See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
109 Langrock, supra note 103, at 733-34.
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cedure, results in a clash of discovery procedures under the two
bills. It is doubtful that the two bills, L.B. 702 and L.B. 1417, can
be reconciled.
If reconciliation is possible, either by construction or repeal,
L.B. 1417 will need careful application and interpretation to achieve
its purposes. The Nebraska Supreme Court should construe the act
so as to aid in the establishment of a uniform standard through
reasoned elaboration of individual cases. Constitutional questions
should be carefully considered by those who apply the act in the
first instance and those who will be called upon to determine the
legality of the application. The act must be considered not an end
in itself, but only one means, in an infinite spectrum of time, by
which man seeks the effective and just administration of the crim-
inal law.
John R. Snowden '71
